Misaligned by Design: Incentive Failures in Machine Learning PDF
Experiments show aligning AI training with users’ goals can weaken learning and yield worse decisions than post-training adjustments.
Wilcox Family Chair in Entrepreneurial Economics, UCSB Economics
I study attention and perception (how information is processed) and information disclosure (how information is communicated). My current research explores how human and AI interactions are shaped by attention, perception, and information disclosure.
Experiments show aligning AI training with users’ goals can weaken learning and yield worse decisions than post-training adjustments.
We experimentally study belief updating from AI recommendations when the data-generating process is unknown.
Using tennis data, we find that AI review improves umpires’ accuracy on close calls and shifts errors toward less disruptive mistakes.
In an online work experiment, we find that AI evaluation increases output but lowers quality after accounting for output quantity.
We run a field experiment on DiagnosUs to study the prevalence effect in AI labeling.
In a controlled experiment, we find that AI assistance benefits people most when they have lower baseline ability and well-calibrated beliefs.
We show that training AI on bias-corrected human probability judgments improves accuracy and alignment with expert judgments.
In medical-image experiments, we show that correcting annotators’ judgment biases improves both labels and trained AI models.
By varying a medical-image classifier’s training incentives, we find behavior consistent with costly learning rather than fixed capacity.
We survey academics on AI disclosure norms and test whether AI detectors identify GPT-modified abstracts.
Working papers not directly related to humans and AI.
Using a search-and-matching model, we show that improving low-quality offers can discourage due diligence and leave more searchers unmatched and worse off.
Applying a new theoretical test to existing perceptual experiments, we find evidence that stronger incentives often expand attention beyond fixed capacity limits.
A selected set of papers on attention, perception, and information disclosure.
American Economic Review 101 (7), 2899-2922, 2011
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 13 (2), 141-73, 2021
Journal of Political Economy 129 (11), 3185-3205, 2021
Management Science 68 (5), 3236-3261, 2022
Economic Journal 125 (582), 184-202, 2015
Before receiving a PhD in Economics from NYU, I co-founded a small business that is now one of the leading providers of IT services to small and medium-sized businesses in the Carolinas.
At UCSB I teach a seminar course on entrepreneurship and a lecture class on behavioral economics. I also teach PhD classes on behavioral economics and attention and perception.
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