All Topics | Attention and Perception | Information Disclosure | Behavioral Welfare Economics
Published papers

1)
Search and Satisficing (with Andrew Caplin and Mark Dean)
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Experiments, Revealed Preference.
Summary: We develop a search-theoretic choice experiment to study the impact of incomplete consideration on choice quality. We find that decisions can be understood using the satisficing model of Herbert Simon.
     American Economic Review, 2011 [Appendix] [Replication resources: Data+Programs]

2) A Testable Theory of Imperfect Perception (with Andrew Caplin)
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Revealed Preference.
Summary: We introduce “state-dependent stochastic choice data” and an axiom called “No Improving Action Switches” (NIAS) that characterizes the choice behavior of an agent with private information about states of the world.
     The Economic Journal, 2015
     Previous working paper: Framing Effects and Optimization (additional: uncertainty about frames)
     Previous working paper: NBER Working Paper 17163 (additional: experimental test of the model)

3) Measuring Rationality with the Minimum Cost of Revealed Preference Violations (with Mark Dean)
Topics: Behavioral Welfare Economics. Methods: Revealed Preference.
Summary: We offer a new measure of how close a set of choices is to satisfying the observable implications of preference maximization and apply it to a large, balanced panel of household level consumption data.
     Review of Economics and Statistics, 2016 [Appendix] [Replication resources: Programs]
     Previous working paper: Testing for Rationality with Consumption Data (additional: test of preference homogeneity in a population)
     Previous working paper: How Rational are your Choice Data? (additional: experimental data, estimate of the number of preferences)

4) The Dual-Process Drift Diffusion Model: Evidence from Response Times (with Andrew Caplin)
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Experiments.
Summary: We propose a model of response time and choice that borrows from dual-process models and the drift diffusion model. We conduct a simple experiment in which our hybrid model matches key properties of the data.
     Economic Inquiry, 2016 [Replication resources: Data+Programs]

5) Strategic Pricing with Rational Inattention to Quality
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Game Theory.
Summary: I study how sellers set prices when facing buyers who are "rationally inattentive" to information about product quality. Two cases are studied: sophisticated buyers and naive buyers who are rationally inattentive to their strategic beliefs.
     Games and Economic Behavior, 2017
     Previous working paper: First version (additional: experimental test of the model)

6) Defaults and Attention: The Drop Out Effect (with Andrew Caplin)
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Experiments.
Summary: We measure the drop out effect — where a default option is accepted with little regard for personal suitability — in an experiment using response time as a proxy for attention. We find this effect can completely offset the benefits of high quality defaults.
     Revue Économique, 2017 [Appendix]
     Previous working paper: NBER Working Paper 17988 (additional: prevalence of “drop outs” in an active choice setting)

Working papers

7) Complex Disclosure (with Ginger Jin and Michael Luca)
Topics: Attention and Perception, Information Disclosure. Methods: Experiments.
Summary: Using lab experiments, we implement a game of mandatory disclosure where senders are required to report their private information truthfully, but can choose how complex to make their reports. We find senders use complex disclosure over half the time.
     Latest draft: May 2018

8) Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure (with Ginger Jin and Michael Luca)
Topics: Information Disclosure. Methods: Experiments.
Summary: This paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test the forces that drive disclosure theory. We find a fundamental breakdown in the logic of unraveling: receivers are insufficiently skeptical about undisclosed information.
     Latest draft: May 2018 [Coverage: Vox EU, HBS Working Knowledge]

9) Framing as Information Design (with Andrew Caplin)
Topics: Attention and Perception, Behavioral Welfare Economics. Methods: Revealed Preference.
Summary: We propose an information design framework for studying the welfare impact of frames. In our model, the frame determines a decision maker’s information structure, which summarizes his or her beliefs about the consequences of taking each action.
     Latest draft: February 2018

10) Predictive Power in Behavioral Welfare Economics (with Elias Bouacida)
Topics: Behavioral Welfare Economics. Methods: Revealed Preference.
Summary: Is it necessary to impose model structure in order to provide meaningful welfare guidance based on inconsistent choices? We address this question empirically by evaluating the predictive power of an approach proposed by Bernheim and Rangel (2009).
     Latest draft: April 2017