Published, forthcoming, and accepted papers

1) Search and Satisficing (with Andrew Caplin and Mark Dean)
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Experiments, Revealed Preference.
Summary: We develop a search-theoretic choice experiment to study the impact of incomplete consideration on choice quality. We find that decisions can be understood using the satisficing model of Herbert Simon.
     American Economic Review, 2011 [Appendix] [Replication resources: Data and Analysis Files]

2) A Testable Theory of Imperfect Perception (with Andrew Caplin)
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Revealed Preference.
Summary: We introduce “state-dependent stochastic choice data” and an axiom called “No Improving Action Switches” (NIAS) that characterizes the choice behavior of an agent with private information about states of the world.
     The Economic Journal, 2015
         Previous working paper: NBER Working Paper 17163 (Additional: experimental test of the model)

3) Measuring Rationality with the Minimum Cost of Revealed Preference Violations (with Mark Dean)
Topics: Behavioral Welfare Economics. Methods: Revealed Preference.
Summary: We offer a new measure of how close a set of choices is to satisfying the observable implications of preference maximization and apply it to a large, balanced panel of household level consumption data.
     Review of Economics and Statistics, 2016 [Appendix] [Replication resources: Data and Analysis Files, Updated MCI Files, MCI Source Code]
         Previous working paper: Testing for Rationality with Consumption Data (Additional: test of preference homogeneity in a population)
         Previous working paper: How Rational are your Choice Data? (Additional: experimental data, estimate of the number of preferences)

4) The Dual-Process Drift Diffusion Model: Evidence from Response Times (with Andrew Caplin)
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Experiments.
Summary: We propose a model of response time and choice that borrows from dual-process models and the drift diffusion model. We conduct a simple experiment in which our hybrid model matches key properties of the data.
     Economic Inquiry, 2016 [Replication resources: Data and Analysis Files]

5) Strategic Pricing with Rational Inattention to Quality
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Game Theory.
Summary: I study how sellers set prices when facing buyers who are "rationally inattentive" to information about product quality. Two cases are studied: sophisticated buyers and naive buyers who are rationally inattentive to their strategic beliefs.
     Games and Economic Behavior, 2017
         Previous working paper: First version (Additional: experimental test of the model)

6) Defaults and Attention: The Drop Out Effect (with Andrew Caplin)
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Experiments.
Summary: We measure the drop out effect — where a default option is accepted with little regard for personal suitability — in an experiment using response time as a proxy for attention. We find this effect can completely offset the benefits of high quality defaults.
     Revue Économique, 2017 [Appendix]
         Previous working paper: NBER Working Paper 17988 (Additional: prevalence of “drop outs” in an active choice setting)

7) What Do Consumers Learn from Regulator Ratings? Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Quality Disclosures (with Tami Kim)
Topics: Information Disclosure. Methods: Experiments.
Summary: Using online experiments, we provide evidence that there are two pathways through which individuals extract the information contained in regulator ratings: inference about the relative implications of a rating and inference about the absolute implications of a rating.
     Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2021 [Appendix]

8) Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure (with Ginger Jin and Michael Luca)
Topics: Information Disclosure. Methods: Experiments.
Summary: We use laboratory experiments to directly test the forces that drive disclosure theory. We find a fundamental breakdown in the logic of unraveling: receivers are insufficiently skeptical about undisclosed information.
     AEJ: Microeconomics, 2021 [Replication resources: Data and Analysis Files, Instructions for Additional Tasks]
         Previous working paper: NBER Working Paper 21099
         Coverage: Vox EU, HBS Working Knowledge

9) Predictive Power in Behavioral Welfare Economics (with Elias Bouacida)
Topics: Behavioral Welfare Economics. Methods: Revealed Preference.
Summary: Is it necessary to impose model structure in order to provide precise welfare guidance based on inconsistent choices? We address this question empirically by evaluating the predictive power of two behavioral welfare relations.
     Journal of European Economics Association, 2021

10) Complex Disclosure (with Ginger Jin and Michael Luca)
Topics: Attention and Perception, Information Disclosure. Methods: Experiments.
Summary: Using lab experiments, we implement a game of mandatory disclosure where senders are required to report their private information truthfully, but can choose how complex to make their reports. We find senders use complex disclosure over half the time.
     Management Science, Forthcoming [Appendix] [Replication resources: Data and Analysis Files]

11) Comparison of Decisions under Unknown Experiments (with Andrew Caplin)
Topics: Attention and Perception, Behavioral Welfare Economics. Methods: Revealed Preference.
Summary: We provide a necessary and sufficient condition that identifies when every experiment consistent with one set of decisions has a higher value of information than every experiment consistent with the other set of decisions.
     Journal of Political Economy, Forthcoming

Working papers

A Robust Test of Prejudice for Discrimination Experiments (with Philip Marx)
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Experiments, Revealed Preference.
Summary: We show that if average outcomes in a discrimination experiment satisfy simple conditions, then this provides evidence that decision-makers are prejudiced, regardless of what they learned about individuals in each demographic group before making their decisions.
     Latest draft: May 2021

Misperceiving Mechanisms: Imperfect Perception and the Failure to Recognize Dominant Strategies (with Edwin Munoz-Rodriguez)
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Experiments.
Summary: We study the link between misperception of mechanisms and the use of dominant strategies by applying standard techniques from the literatures on perception and attention to a widely-used single agent mechanism.
     Latest draft: May 2019

Rational Inattention in Games: Experimental Evidence
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Experiments.
Summary: I test the predictions of rational inattention theory using a laboratory experiment where one role in a two-player game faces cognitive costs to process information about a payoff-relevant state and find that subjects are largely consistent with these predictions.
     Latest draft: August 2016, New experiments in progress