Published and accepted papers

1) Search and Satisficing (with Andrew Caplin and Mark Dean)
Topics: Inattention/Perception, Behavioral Economics. Methods: Experiments, Revealed Preference.
Summary: We develop a search-theoretic choice experiment to study the impact of incomplete consideration on choice quality. We find that decisions can be understood using the satisficing model of Herbert Simon.
     American Economic Review, 2011 [Appendix] [Replication resources: Data+Programs]

2) A Testable Theory of Imperfect Perception (with Andrew Caplin)
Topics: Inattention/Perception. Methods: Revealed Preference.
Summary: We introduce “state-dependent stochastic choice data” and an axiom called “No Improving Action Switches” (NIAS) that characterizes the choice behavior of an agent with private information about states of the world.
     The Economic Journal, 2015
     Previous working paper: NBER Working Paper 17163 (additional: experimental test of the model)

3) Measuring Rationality with the Minimum Cost of Revealed Preference Violations (with Mark Dean)
Topics: Behavioral Economics. Methods: Revealed Preference.
Summary: We offer a new measure of how close a set of choices is to satisfying the observable implications of preference maximization and apply it to a large, balanced panel of household level consumption data.
     Review of Economics and Statistics, 2016 [Appendix] [Replication resources: Programs]
     Previous working paper: Testing for Rationality with Consumption Data (additional: test of preference homogeneity in a population)
     Previous working paper: How Rational are your Choice Data? (additional: experimental data, estimate of the number of preferences)

4) Strategic Pricing with Rational Inattention to Quality
Topics: Inattention/Perception, Behavioral Economics.
Summary: Using a standard pricing game, I study the informational content of prices when buyers are “rationally inattentive” to product quality. Two cases are examined: strategically sophisticated buyers and strategically naive buyers.
     Games and Economic Behavior, 2017
     Previous working paper: First version (additional: experimental test of the model)

Shorter papers

5) The Dual-Process Drift Diffusion Model: Evidence from Response Times (with Andrew Caplin)
Topics: Inattention/Perception, Behavioral Economics. Methods: Experiments.
Summary: We propose a model of response time and choice that borrows from dual-process models and the drift diffusion model. We conduct a simple experiment in which our hybrid model matches key properties of the data.
     Economic Inquiry, 2016 [Replication resources: Data+Programs]

6) Defaults and Attention: The Drop Out Effect (with Andrew Caplin)
Topics: Inattention/Perception, Behavioral Economics. Methods: Experiments.
Summary: We measure the drop out effect — where a default option is accepted with little regard for personal suitability — in an experiment using decision time as a proxy for attention. We find this effect can completely offset the benefits of high quality defaults.
     Revue Économique, forthcoming [Appendix]
     Previous working paper: NBER Working Paper 17988 (additional: prevalence of “drop outs” in an active choice setting)

Working papers

7) Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure (with Ginger Jin and Michael Luca)
Topics: Information Disclosure, Behavioral Economics. Methods: Experiments.
Summary: This paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test the forces that drive disclosure theory. We find a fundamental breakdown in the logic of unraveling: receivers are insufficiently skeptical about undisclosed information.
     Latest draft: August 2016, R&R at Review of Economic Studies [Coverage: Vox EU, HBS Working Knowledge]

8) Predictive Power in Behavioral Welfare Economics (with Elias Bouacida)
Topics: Behavioral Economics. Methods: Revealed Preference.
Summary: Is it necessary to impose model structure in order to provide meaningful welfare guidance based on inconsistent choices? We address this question empirically by evaluating the predictive power of an approach proposed by Bernheim and Rangel (2009).
     Latest draft: April 2017, Submitted

Older working papers

9) Framing Effects and Optimization (with Andrew Caplin)
Topics: Inattention/Perception, Behavioral Economics. Methods: Experiments, Revealed Preference.
Summary: The decision maker in our model has prior beliefs about the correlation between frames and payoffs, hence framing effects arise endogenously as an optimal response to payoff uncertainty.
     Latest draft: April 2012

10) Rational Inattention in Games: Experimental Evidence
Topics: Inattention/Perception. Methods: Experiments.
Summary: This paper presents experimental evidence that the predictions of rational inattention theory are consistent with behavior in a two-player game where one role faces an unobservable cognitive cost to process information about a payoff-relevant state.
     Latest draft: January 2016 [Replication resources: Data+Programs]